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Executive summary
Housing bubbles are a well-known source of financial instability. In addition, given the 
importance of this sector to the economy, the collapse of such bubbles tends to be followed 
by deeper recessions and slower recoveries than other crises, as the recent boom-bust 
housing cycles in many countries have clearly demonstrated. 
In the European union, the policy instruments available to address this and to prevent 
future housing bubbles are implemented either at the national level (macroprudential 
policies) or at the euro-area level (monetary policy). However, recent research suggests that 
house price developments and bubbles are above all a local phenomenon.
There are significant regional differences in house price developments within 
EU countries, in particular between capital cities and other regions. Our results suggest that 
house price fluctuations in capital cities tend to be more volatile and stronger than in the rest 
of the countries, warranting more targeted measures at the local level.
We propose to use differentiated macroprudential policy at the regional level. This could 
be done with the application of different loan-to-value (LTV) or debt-to-income (DTI) limits 
for mortgages in capital cities and in the rest of the countries, in order to tighten policy more 
quickly in areas more prone to overheating. This type of policy has already been successfully 
applied in Korea. Competent authorities in the EU should consider adding this instrument 
to their toolkits in order to increase the precision, and therefore the effectiveness, of their 
policies.
This paper is accompanied by an online annex available at: http://bruegel.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/10/Housing-prices-City-vs-Rest-Annex-161017.pdf
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1 Introduction
Rapidly rising house prices are a well-known source of financial instability. When fuelled by 
credit booms1, asset price bubbles increase the risk of a financial crisis2, and the collapse of 
such bubbles tends to be followed by deeper recessions and slower recoveries. Debt-financed 
house price bubbles have emerged as a particularly dangerous phenomenon for two reasons. 
First, mortgages that are not repaid cause losses for the financial system. Second, households 
in negative equity (ie when the value of the house is lower than the outstanding mortgage) 
reduce their consumption significantly to rebuild their equity positions. This deepens the 
economic downturn (Mian, Rao and Sufi, 2013). By the same token, households increase their 
consumption when house prices are rising. Housing can thus be a strong pro-cyclical force in 
the economy, as housing boom-bust cycles in Spain and Ireland have made abundantly clear. 
The cyclical pattern of house prices is very strong because households, as non-professional 
investors, mainly base their house price expectations on current price developments, even 
if these expectations look unrealistic from an ex-post perspective3. Such expectations have a 
reinforcing effect both when house prices are rising and when they are falling. More remarkably, 
these price expectations are mainly local: in some cities, house prices might increase, but not in 
others, as Shiller (2008) shows. 
This Policy Contribution examines whether there are regional differences in house price 
growth within European countries and, if so, whether this warrants more targeted measures 
to address vulnerabilities4. The monitoring of vulnerabilities and potential imbalances in 
European housing markets is carried out jointly by the European Systemic Risk Board5 and 
by national authorities. Their analyses are done mainly at the country level. Though essential, 
tracking only national indicators means that these analyses might miss imbalances developing 
within countries. In Denmark, for example, the International Monetary Fund noted the growing 
divergence of house prices within the country and found evidence of signs of overvaluation in 
Copenhagen (Chen et al, 2016).
We focus on the division in terms of house prices between the capital cities and the rest 
of the territories of six EU countries for which there are sufficiently long series of house price 
indices (HPI) at the regional level. Capital cities are important because they tend to be large and 
densely populated and because they possess structural (supply-side) characteristics that can 
amplify the response of prices to shocks. We do not examine the drivers of property prices at the 
regional level, nor do we set out to identify potential bubbles, which is very difficult in real time. 
Instead, we calculate indicators that can be used by policymakers to gauge the level of overval-
uation of residential housing separately for national capitals and the rest of the country, in order 
to see if there are significant divergences between the two.
A stronger cyclical pattern of property prices – coupled with slower growth of household dis-
posable income in capital cities – would represent an additional source of financial vulnerabil-
ity. This combination could lead households in capital cities to carry heavier debts (compared to 
their income) and thus be more vulnerable to economic shocks, with implications for financial 
stability if those households are not able to repay their mortgages. Moreover, price develop-
ments in the capital region might spill-over to neighbouring regions within each country, caus-
ing price changes that might be even less justified by the fundamentals of these regions.
A stronger cyclical pattern in capital cities compared to other regions within each country 
would indicate a clear rationale for regional-level tools. The usual instrument to dampen 
1   Jordà, Schularick and Taylor (2015), in a study of bubbles in housing and equity markets in 17 countries over 140 
years, showed that credit-financed bubbles are more dangerous than equity-financed bubbles.
2   The financial instability hypothesis of Minsky (1986) is based on rising asset prices financed by credit expansion.
3   As shown by, for example, Schoenmaker and Wierts (2017).
4   The topic of regional house price differentials appears to be underexplored in the economic literature, especially 
when it comes to Europe (see the short literature review available in the online annex to this paper). 
5   See for instance European Systemic Risk Board (2015 and 2016).
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cycles is the central bank’s interest rate, but its effects are felt economy-wide. Moreover, since 
the creation of the single currency, the euro area has one interest rate for the area as a whole, 
without differentiation between countries, let alone regions. That makes national and/or 
regional instruments to dampen financial cycles even more necessary. An instrument that 
could be used locally is tax. However, even though property taxes or stamp duties could be 
targeted regionally, adjusting taxes often to dampen house prices would be very difficult. The 
political decision-making and subsequent administrative implementation process is usually 
very slow, so that changes in the levels of the tax might even become procyclical. Structural 
measures to adjust the housing supply, such as relaxing planning restrictions, could also be 
useful to alleviate the pressure on house prices, but have typically a long lead time. 
An alternative to address house-price imbalances is to use loan-to-value (LTV) and debt-
to-income (DTI) limits. These borrower-based macroprudential instruments can be tightened 
to curb excessive house-price rises6. So far, their use in the European Union has only been 
based on the evolution of national house-price indices and applied at the national level. But 
regional use of these instruments might be desirable and is technically feasible, because 
houses are immovable and recorded in the land registry, which makes circumvention of 
regional policies difficult.
2 Building a European regional house price 
dataset
To assess the risks of regional differences in house price developments in the EU, house price 
index (HPI) data at the regional level for EU countries is needed7. Obtaining this is not easy. 
Most analyses focus on how house prices evolve in terms of national averages, and little atten-
tion is paid to differences in house price growth that might develop within a country. Whereas 
some factors influencing house prices are national (eg the availability of credit and the central 
bank’s policy rate), housing markets are by definition tied to location and thus involve a com-
ponent of supply and demand that is local in nature.
But the HPI series available for EU countries are neither standardised nor centralised 
in single databases. For 18 EU countries index series with some form of regional/territorial 
breakdown are available (Table 1)8. For another four countries, we found average/median 
prices, which unlike indices do not account for changes in the composition of properties 
sold and their quality (see the online annex for a detailed discussion). We collected HPI data 
exclusively from national statistical institutes and national central banks, which make their 
series publicly available. Where HPI is available from other sources, such as private-sector 
financial institutions (for example in the UK), we give preference to the official HPI data for 
consistency reasons9.
6   Borrower-based instruments target homebuyers who need a mortgage, but not cash buyers. Mortgage buyers are 
particularly vulnerable to house-price shocks, because of their outstanding mortgage. Borrower-based instru-
ments will still have (partial) impact on house prices, as the number of buyers on the market is reduced.
7   The online annex explains why indices are used, addresses the concept of internal consistency of aggregate indices 
and presents the sources and properties of the data used in this paper. 
8   See the online annex to this paper for details.
9   See the online annex to this paper for a comparison of sources.
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Table 1: HPI availability at the regional level, EU countries
Indices Prices Not available
Austria Finland Netherlands Belgium Italy
Bulgaria France Poland Estonia Latvia
Croatia Germany Slovenia Hungary Luxembourg
Cyprus Greece Spain Slovakia Malta
Czech 
Republic
Ireland Sweden Portugal
Denmark Lithuania UK Romania
Source: Bruegel (see online annex).
National HPI data within each EU country has been developed independently and serves 
national needs and possibly reflects the different structural characteristics of housing markets 
in different countries, making it hard to compare the indices of different countries. Regional/
territorial breakdowns are thus not uniform. Consequently, we stick mainly to within-country 
comparisons.
We use, and where possible construct, the index with the most complete coverage for 
each country. Finally, time series have to be sufficiently long in order to identify patterns. We 
use only data from countries for which more than 20 years of data is available. This reduces 
our sample to six EU countries: Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Sweden and the 
UK10. Box 1 on page 14 provides information on Austria, Greece, Ireland and Lithuania, for 
which less than 20 years of data is available, and on Germany. 
3 Results: are capital cities different from 
other regions?
The capital cities of Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK are those 
countries’ most populous urban centres, giving their associated local housing markets nation-
al importance. For Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK, HPI series for the rest of 
the country excluding the capital city are not readily available but can be created11, in order to 
show house price growth and price-to-income ratios at the regional level. 
These are certainly not the only indicators used to monitor developments in the residen-
tial sector. However, apart from being directly (or indirectly) available at the regional level, 
these two metrics are widely-used and have a good record of performance in highlighting 
vulnerabilities. In his discussion of a framework for macroprudential policy, Goodhart (2011)  
refers to the monitoring of a set of early warning “presumptive indicators” including “a rate 
of growth of housing (and property) prices which is significantly faster than normal and above 
its normal trend relationship with incomes”. Moreover, the European Systemic Risk Board has 
10  The data for the UK covers only England and Wales because data for Scotland and Northern Ireland is only availa-
ble starting from 2004 and 2005 respectively. 
11  We exploit the consistency of the respective HPI and re-aggregate the constituent regional indices. The online 
appendix explains the method in detail.
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undertaken a comprehensive study assessing the predictive capacity of a set of early-warning 
indicators (Ferrari, Pirovano and Cornacchia, 2015). In an EU-wide setting, nominal house 
price growth and price-to-income gaps were ranked among the most reliable early-warning 
indicators of unsustainable bubbles. 
Figure 1 compares house price developments in the capitals and the rest of the territory 
in the six countries of our sample, relative to house prices at the start of the period in each 
case. Because the HPI data tracks house price growth (not absolute price levels) relative to 
a certain point in time, it follows that it is important to know the conditions prevailing at the 
start point in order to understand the influence of base effects. The shaded areas in Figure 
1 show periods of housing crises (using the dating convention from Ferrari, Pirovano and 
Cornacchia, 2015). In the early 1990s, when most of the series began, all of the countries of 
our sample with the exception of the Netherlands went through housing crises, meaning the 
series start in the trough of the cycle12.
Figure 1: House price indices, beginning of period = 100
Source: Bruegel (see the online annex). Note: The shaded areas represent periods of real estate-related banking crisis, based on a table 
from Ferrari et al (2015). For France, we included the series for Paris (apartments only) for illustration purposes.
12 In the UK, the crisis lasted from the third quarter of 1990 to the second quarter of 1994, ie it ended two quarters 
before the start of the series. The starts of the crises in Denmark and France are not contained in the chart: they 
began in the first quarter of 1987 and the third quarter of 1993 respectively. 
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Figure 2 shows year-on-year HPI growth rates while Table 2 lists some of the descriptive 
statistics of the HPI growth rates. Higher average price growth in capitals over the longer run 
suggests that the price differential has structural features, such as persistently higher demand 
and less-responsive housing supply caused by restricted land supply and/or stricter planning 
rules in capitals. Interestingly, house prices in capitals also seem to have a stronger cyclical 
component, with higher upturns and deeper downturns. This stronger cyclical pattern is 
confirmed by more volatile year-on-year growth rates in capital cities, with the exception of 
London. As can be seen in Table 2, standard deviations and max/min of the price growth in 
one year are clearly higher in capital cities than in the rest of the countries.
Figure 2: HPI year-on-year growth rates (%)
Source: Bruegel. Note: See Figure 1. 
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Table 2: House prices, descriptive statistics, year-on-year changes (%)
Average year-on-
year growth rate
Standard 
deviation
Min of year-on-
year growth rate
Max of year-on-
year growth rate
Denmark
Copenhagen 9.78 12.10 -19.89 43.13
Rest of 
Denmark
5.86 8.09 -14.47 27.64
Finland
Helsinki 3.62 10.33 -25.61 35.22
Rest of Finland 2.57 7.84 -17.78 37.17
France
Paris 3.70 7.63 -11.26 17.97
Ile de France 4.53 6.04 -10.25 13.65
Rest of France 3.96 5.59 -9.85 14.06
Netherlands
Amsterdam 7.17 9.38 -9.34 30.96
Rest of the 
Netherlands
4.53 6.72 -8.88 19.61
Sweden
Stockholm 7.45 9.47 -22.32 30.67
Rest of Sweden 5.91 6.29 -13.63 20.23
United Kingdom
London 9.34 7.84 -16.66 28.34
Rest of 
England and 
Wales
7.14 7.96 -15.35 27.15
Source: Bruegel.
Table 3 shows compound annual growth rates in house prices for the capital city and the 
rest of the country for each country in our sample. Use of compound annual growth rates 
enables us to better compare trends during two separate periods – before and after the most 
recent downturns in each country. The price growth differential between the capitals and the 
other parts of each country ranges from 0.6 to 3.5 percentage points. Overall, there is evidence 
that property price growth in each capital is persistently higher than in the rest of the country. 
Another striking feature of the data is the different responses of house prices after the most 
recent downturn. Table 3 also shows the compound annual growth rates in the periods before 
and after the most recent trough, which, except for Denmark, coincide for the capital and the 
rest of the country in each of our sample countries. Within-country differences in growth rates 
have widened in the latest phase of rising house prices, mainly as a result of price growth out-
side the capitals remaining below its previous average. In fact, the price level when excluding 
the capital city is lower than the previous peak in all countries except Sweden and the UK 
(England and Wales). On the other hand, price rises in capital cities have been relatively con-
stant in the two sub-periods. Two exceptions stand out: in Amsterdam, price rises after prices 
bottomed in 2013 have outpaced the historical norm, while in Ile de France, prices have 
been slower to rise since 2009. Low mortgage interest rates, as a result of the central banks’ 
accommodative monetary policies might also have contributed to recent rising house prices 
in several capital cities. 
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Table 3: HPI, compound annual growth rates
Compound annual growth rates Dates
Whole 
period
Before 
last 
trough
After last 
trough
Whole 
period: 
start
Whole 
period: 
end
Last 
trough
DK
Copenhagen 8.8 9.3 7.7 1992q1 2016q4 2009q1
Rest of 
Denmark
5.3 5.6 4.3 1992q1 2016q4 2011q4
FI
Helsinki 3.4 3.3 3.1 1988q1 2017q1 2009q1
Rest of Finland 2.6 3.2 0.9 1988q1 2017q1 2009q1
FR
Paris 5.2 5.6 4.5 1994q4 2016q4 2009q2
Rest of France 4.2 6.3 0.3 1994q4 2016q4 2009q2
NL
Amsterdam 6.9 6.3 9.8 1995q1 2017q1 2013q1
Rest of the 
Netherlands
4.4 4.6 3.4 1995q1 2017q1 2013q2
SE
Stockholm 7.1 7.4 6.5 1987q1 2017q1 2010q4
Rest of Sweden 5.8 6.1 4.9 1987q1 2017q1 2010q4
UK
London 8.8 8.7 8.7 1995m1 2017m4 2009m4
Rest of 
England and 
Wales
6.7 8.0 4.2 1995m1 2017m4 2009m3
Source: Bruegel. Note: The method for selecting peaks and troughs is based on an algorithm developed by Harding and Pagan (2002) to 
define business cycles. The user must choose a rule: the shortest possible length for a cycle (time between two peaks) and for a phase 
(time between a peak and a trough). The algorithm then selects those peaks and troughs that respect the rule. We apply it to HPI levels 
and set the rule at 12 quarters for the length of the cycle and 3 quarters for the phase. The reason is that periods of declining prices 
(contraction phases) are generally much shorter than periods of rising prices (expansion phases). The algorithm does not identify recent 
troughs for Sweden so we consider the end date of the real estate-related crisis as it appears in Ferrari et al (2015). We also ignore the last 
trough that the algorithm identifies for France, because it appears to be spurious.   
Price growth in capital cities thus generally tends to be more volatile and more pro-
nounced compared to the rest of the country in each case13. Meanwhile current price rises 
outside the capitals in each country remain subdued compared to the average over previous 
cycles. These different developments point to the need for a differentiated approach when it 
comes to the residential property markets in large cities and in the rest of each country (with 
greater vigilance needed for the former). Rapidly increasing property prices can be a sign of 
overheating in the housing market and raise the possibility of a housing bubble forming. At 
the heart of these risks is a misalignment between prevailing market prices and the value of 
residential housing assets justified by economic fundamentals. We look at price-to-income 
ratios (house prices relative to household disposable income) to assess the affordability of 
housing in our sample countries. The price-to-income ratio has the advantage of being calcu-
lable at the regional level.
A rising price-to-income ratio indicates less affordable housing, with residential property 
prices growing faster than the disposable income of households. Unfortunately, as house-
hold disposable income is taken from annual regional accounts, data is published only after 
a delay and the most recent data available is from 2015 or before. Since the within-country 
spread in property price growth has increased substantially in the last couple of years, ie after 
the latest available data point for disposable income in some cases, we extend the dispos-
able income series to 2016, based on the corresponding national figures from the national 
13  We present the Ile-de-France series instead of the Paris series because the series for Paris is only for apartments 
(there is no series for houses) and can therefore not be compared to the rest of France. Nevertheless, the two series 
are very similar. 
9 Policy Contribution | Issue n˚26 | October 2017
accounts, which are published more quickly than the regional data (see notes to Figure 3).
Figure 3 shows price-to-income ratios for the national capital and the rest of each country 
normalised to 100 at the start of the series. Over time, ratios have generally increased, imply-
ing that housing is becoming less affordable for the average household. Longer-term averages 
could act as a benchmark against which we could compare recent developments or measure 
a price-to-income gap. However, in most cases here the ratios are not stationary, making 
averages less useful. The upward trend of the ratios is explained by the fact that real estate-re-
lated financial crises took place at the beginning of the 1990s in most of the countries in our 
sample. The series for Denmark and Finland begin in 2000, resulting in relatively more stable 
price-to-income ratios when capital cities are excluded.
Figure 3: Price-to-income ratios, beginning of period = 100
Source: Bruegel. Note: Price-to-income ratios are obtained by dividing the HPI series by the household sector’s disposable income per 
capita from regional accounts and normalised to 100 at the beginning of the sample period (1995, except for 2000 for Denmark and 
Finland). Growth rates of regional disposable income beyond the last data point are predictions of a linear regression of growth rates on 
national disposable income from national accounts and a constant. Projections extend to 2016 except for Denmark, where the annual HPI 
series stops in 2015. Disposable income data is not available at the municipal level for Amsterdam or for Greater Helsinki; growth rates for 
the region of North Holland and the sub-region of Helsinki are used instead. Depending on the availability, gross (DK, FR, UK) or net (FI, 
NL, SE) disposable income (of consumption of fixed capital) was used but the intra-country comparisons stick to the same definition of 
disposable income. See the online annex.
In Figure 3, the effect of the global financial crisis is visible at the end of the 2000s and 
though its intensity varies by country, it is clear that before the crisis, price-to-income ratios 
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were increasing in all of the countries in our sample. Moreover, relative differences in afforda-
bility between regions were present but were not extreme. In relative terms, in Denmark, 
Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden, housing in the capital was becoming less affordable 
compared to the rest of the country before the crisis, whereas in France and the UK the 
opposite was the case. However, during the global financial crisis and its aftermath, price-to-
income ratios in the rest of the country in each case stalled or fell, while in capital cities they 
continued increasing either modestly (Helsinki, Ile-de-France) or sharply.  
As with price growth, recent developments in price-to-income ratios point to growing 
divergences and strong growth in capital cities. Affordability has decreased in capital cities 
with the ratio for capital cities at or above its historical peak in all our sample countries. This 
contrasts with relatively stable price-to-income ratios in areas outside the capitals in recent 
years. However, in some countries price-to-income ratios are also rising outside the capital, 
pointing to the need for vigilance at the national level as well. In Sweden, for example, the 
ratio for the country outside Stockholm reached in 2016 its maximum value in the last two 
decades. The price-to-income ratio was also approaching past peaks in England and Wales 
outside London. But even in these two cases, there is evidence of a decoupling between capi-
tals and the rest of the country. 
Persistently decreasing affordability in capital cities is relevant for financial stability, to 
the extent that it could lead households in capitals to become excessively leveraged, thereby 
bringing into question their ability to service their debts in case of shocks (such as changes 
in interest rates or income levels). These diverging trends in affordability between parts of 
countries calls for a differentiated approach in instruments. We consider this possibility in the 
remainder of this paper.
4 Policy options and concluding remarks
Capital cities are different. It is clear that their more rapidly rising house prices are partly 
related to structural factors. These include faster population growth than areas outside the 
capitals, which is related to movement of labour from the provincial areas to the main cities 
and migration (migrants tend to concentrate in the most-populated urban areas). These 
movements might be spurred by the rise of new services and digital companies. These 
firms typically base themselves in larger cities (with good airport connections and good 
‘lifestyle’ facilities), whereas industrial companies are typically more spread out over the 
country. Combined with a shortage of new homes in the capital cities, the extra demand 
leads to price rises if the supply is not elastic, which is often the case in capital cities which 
are already densely built-up and where planning restrictions are often stricter than in the 
countryside. Some of these restrictions could be relaxed to reduce the supply constraint, 
but, as our results show, house prices in capitals are also more volatile than in other areas. 
Structural measures by themselves might not be enough to moderate house price cycles in 
capital cities. Macroprudential measures appear to be more adequate to tackle the cyclical 
nature of the problem. However, are policies based on national house price indices appro-
priate for dealing with the specific overly-cyclical pattern of capital cities?
In November 2016, the European Systemic Risk Board issued warnings to five of the six 
countries in our sample (France was the exception) and to an additional three (Austria, 
Belgium and Luxembourg) on the basis of systemic risks stemming from their residen-
tial real estate sectors in the medium term. The sources of the vulnerabilities in these five 
cases were the combination of high household indebtedness and potentially risky price 
dynamics. Concern about rapidly growing and overvalued prices was voiced in particular 
for Sweden, Denmark and the UK. The analyses underlying these warnings highlighted the 
divergence in prices between parts of each country, for instance in Denmark. The European 
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Commission, the International Monetary Fund and the Organisation for Economic Cooper-
ation and Development have raised similar points.
In addition, the ESRB analyses did not identify risks stemming directly from lenders’ 
balance sheets. EU-level safeguards (from the Capital Requirements Regulation and Direc-
tive), both in general and specifically in relation to residential real estate (sectoral capital 
requirements and risk-weights, limits on losses in cases of default) appear to have made 
banks’ balance sheets more resilient. Although borrower-based (DTI/loan-to-income/
debt-service-to-income ratios, amortisation) and collateral-based (LTV) macroprudential 
instruments, which are mainly left to national law, have been implemented or announced 
in the aforementioned countries, the ESRB considered them inadequately used in light of 
the risks. Section 4.1, briefly describes the current frameworks in which such macropruden-
tial measures are applied in the countries analysed in section 3.
4.1 Country experiences
In the Netherlands, the maximum LTV in 2010 was 112 percent. It has been undergoing a 
gradual reduction to 100 percent by 2018. The Dutch Financial Stability Committee has advised 
future governments to continue the gradual lowering of the LTV limit for mortgage loans after 
2018 towards 90 percent, by reducing it by one percentage point per year. With house prices 
rising by six percent per year across the Netherlands, this advice appears sensible and there is 
no reason for macroprudential policies to intervene more forcefully. However, high price rises of 
15 percent per year in Amsterdam might justify further macroprudential action to take the heat 
out of that particular market. Notwithstanding the heating up of the Dutch housing market and 
the advice to lower the LTV limit, the incoming Dutch government has the intention to keep the 
LTV limit at 100 percent across the Netherlands.
Private home-owners in Denmark are required to make a down-payment of at least five per-
cent when taking out a loan. Moreover, owing to the within-country divergence in house prices, 
the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority (Finanstilsynet) has seven best practice guidelines, 
to apply only in areas with high price levels and increases. In March 2017, the Danish Systemic 
Risk Council recommended a cap on the flow of new mortgages (15 percent) to borrowers with 
high debt-to-income (DTI) ratios (400 percent or greater) in high-price areas, which include 
the city of Copenhagen and its environs, and the city of Aarhus. The government has called on 
banks to follow the Council’s recommendations.
An 85 percent LTV limit was introduced in Sweden in 2010. In 2016, the Swedish financial 
services authority (Finansinspektionen) decided to impose amortisation requirements on new 
collateralised lending to highly leveraged borrowers (LTV exceeding 50 percent). Specifically, 
mortgages with an LTV ratio of more than 70 percent must be amortised at an annual rate of at 
least two percent of the original amount, with that rate falling to one percent when the LTV is 
between 50 percent and 70 percent. This measure was initially slated to be put in place in 2015 
but its implementation was halted because of doubts about the compatibility of such meas-
ures with the Finansinspektionen’s mandate. Finally, in May 2017, the Finansinspektionen 
announced its proposal to tighten further amortisation requirements by an additional one 
percent annually if DTI ratios exceed 450 percent.  
In Finland, a maximum LTV ratio was introduced in 2016 at 90 percent, with 95 percent for 
first-time buyers. The financial services authority (Finanssivalvonta) may reduce the limit by 10 
percent if tightening is deemed appropriate. 
In the UK, a cap on the quarterly flow of new lending (15 percent of the number of loans) to 
borrowers with high DTIs (above 450 percent), similar to that in Denmark, is in effect. The Bank 
of England Financial Policy Committee also requires lenders to apply an interest rate stress test 
before granting a mortgage. The test assesses whether borrowers can still afford the mortgage if 
the interest rate increases by three percent anytime in the first five years of the loan. 
France has no borrower-based or collateral-based macroprudential measures in place. 
However, although there is no official limit, in practice French credit institutions have all 
adopted a standard whereby all repayments of housing loans (including interest rates pay-
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ments) must not exceed one-third of the borrower’s gross income (Haut Conseil de Stabilité 
Financière, 2017).
4.2 Policy options
All the policies described in section 4.1 (except in Denmark) are implemented at the na-
tional level and do not take into account divergences between capital cities and the rest of 
the countries in our sample. National policies, based on average house price growth, can 
be too blunt to dampen excessive house price growth in capital cities, and too tight for the 
rest of the country where house price growth is subdued. This could be tackled through 
taxes or structural measures, but these would require a long lead-time and would play out 
over the long term. Instead, a differentiated macroprudential policy could be implement-
ed through different LTV or DTI ratios for mortgages in capital cities and in the rest of the 
countries. But where and when should these measures be applied?
Where to differentiate
The first step would be to determine whether there are significant differences between 
capital cities and the rest of a country. If this were the case, a differentiated approach 
would be warranted. 
One country that already does this is Korea, which 15 years ago put in place a differen-
tiated application of LTV and DTI ratios according to zip-codes, in order to tighten policy 
more quickly in areas more prone to overheating. In areas considered ‘bubble-prone’, the 
Korean Financial Services Commission implements tighter LTV ratios, regardless of types 
of housing, or the amount and maturity of new mortgages. LTV ratios are relaxed for first-
time buyers and low-income households (Financial Services Commission, 2017).
An area is designated as a ‘speculative zone’ where special measures might be 
required if both the following two criteria are satisfied (Igan and Kang, 2011): 
• The monthly HPI rose more by than 1.3 times the nationwide CPI inflation rate during 
the previous month;
• Either (i) the average house price growth rate in the previous two months was more 
than 1.3 times the average national rate in the previous two months, or (ii) the average 
of the month-on-month house price growth rates over the previous year was higher 
than the average of the month-on-month national rate over the previous three years.
Since 2002, the Korean authorities have imposed tighter limits on LTV and DTI ratios 
in specific areas on several occasions, and have succeeded in taming local house price 
booms, in terms of both prices and number of transactions (Igan and Kang, 2011). 
A similar framework could be applied in EU countries to prevent overheating of local 
housing markets and its consequences. Applying the criteria used in Korea to the six 
countries in our sample shows that the capital city in each case would qualify as a ‘spec-
ulative zone’ most of the time, especially in periods of rising prices. Figure 4 shows the 
periods (shaded grey) during which the criteria used in Korea would have been fulfilled 
and capital cities would have been considered ‘speculative zones’. 
When to differentiate
With these criteria in place, the second step would be to monitor house prices at the re-
gional level to decide when to tighten or to loosen the policies. When house price growth 
is considered to be excessive in a particular region, the responsible authority would 
impose measures or explain why measures are not taken14. 
However, it is difficult to set a specific house price growth trigger point beyond which 
14  The ‘comply or explain’ strategy was also advocated by Ingves (2017) endorsing a view previously formulated by 
Charles Goodhart (2011).
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action might be taken, in contrast to consumer price index inflation in monetary policy 
(Ingves, 2017). For the responsible authority, it is hard to know what constitutes the 
correct price growth rate at a given time, because house prices are determined by a range 
of different factors that are both cyclical and structural in nature. Indicators are therefore 
necessary to know when to take action, as house prices are very important for financial 
stability.
Figure 4: Designation of ‘speculative areas’, six EU countries 
 Source: Bruegel. Note: Shaded areas indicate the periods during which capital cities in the sample countries would be designated ‘specu-
lative areas’ based on the criteria used in Korea. The criteria have been adjusted to accommodate the quarterly frequency of the HPI series 
(except for London and England/Wales where the frequency is monthly, as in Korea).
Appropriate ranges for the indicator can be established precisely using historical data. As 
a starting point, we suggest that the five to 10 percent annual house price growth range would 
warrant close monitoring, with potential for action if deemed appropriate. The 10 percent or 
more range would set off a ‘comply or explain’ regime: ‘comply’ meaning macroprudential 
measures at the regional level would be tightened, and ‘explain’ meaning provision of a jus-
tification for the lack of measures. The macroprudential authority can publish the indicators 
and the measures (or the lack of them) in its semi-annual financial stability report. Tightening 
of macroprudential policies can be done through lowering LTV and/or DTI limits. In that way, 
the housing boom-bust cycle might be dampened.
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Box 1: HPI in other countries
While at least twenty years of regional house price data is available for the six countries of 
our sample, ten years of regional data is available for another four EU countries (Figure 5).
Figure 5: HPI, index levels (left panels) and annual growth rates (right panels) in Austria, Greece, 
Ireland and Lithuania
Source: Bruegel. Note: The HPI for Greece is limited to apartments and the ‘rest of Greece’ to urban areas other than Athens. The shaded 
areas represent periods of real estate-related banking crisis (see note to Figure 1).
For the largest EU economy, Germany, detailed house price data at the regional level is not 
readily available. The Bundesbank publishes an HPI broken down in terms of geography into: 
seven large cities (Berlin, Cologne, Dusseldorf, Frankfurt (Main), Hamburg, Munich and Stutt-
gart), 127 cities (the seven large cities plus another 120 cities) and the national aggregate. Figure 6 
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plots the index levels and growth rates for the three geographical aggregates. Overall, strong house 
price growth since 2009 is evident in Germany; house prices rose at an accelerating pace between 
2009 and 2013 and continued to grow at a constant but high rate until 2016. Throughout this peri-
od, house prices in the large cities rose faster than in the rest of the country.
Though the Bundesbank does not publish indices for individual cities, the average prices of 
properties sold in each of the seven large cities from the underlying price micro dataset give an in-
dication of differences in growth rates in those cities. Figure 7 shows that house prices in German 
cities have evolved in a similar way in the last three decades. Nevertheless, the recent acceleration 
was stronger in Munich, Hamburg and Berlin (in the case of freehold apartments) compared to 
other cities. In Berlin, detached single-family houses have appreciated little if at all since 1990. 
Moreover, before 2009, apartment prices in Frankfurt and house prices in Cologne increased faster 
than in the other cities. The Bundesbank estimated that in 2016, houses in German cities and 
towns were overvalued by 15 percent to 30 percent, with the apartments in the largest cities being 
the most overvalued (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2017).
Figure 6: HPI (levels and annual growth rates) in Germany
Source: Bruegel. Note: 2004=100. Seven cities= Berlin, Cologne, Dusseldorf, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Munich and Stuttgart.
Figure 7: Average price, seven large German cities (1990=100)
Source: Bruegel based on Bulwiengesa AG. Notes:1990 = 100. The figures do not show HPI values but the average price of properties (by 
type) sold in each of the seven cities. As such, this measure of aggregate prices is not quality adjusted (the Bundesbank uses the method 
of ‘typical cases’ to adjust for quality changes, which requires information at the property level not available to us). The weights used to 
aggregate different property types into the HPI are not publically available. The only aggregation of average price we carry out is between 
new and existing (resold) properties (for freehold apartments and terraced houses) using the Bundesbank HPI weights, which in turn are 
the weights used in the Destatis HPI (weights over 2008-10; BuBa HPI uses 2010-12 but is not available).    
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